Two kinds of social status, with exercises
Social dynamics in a nightclub explained (not really)
Earlier this year, Scott Alexander of Astral Codex Ten (ACX) reviewed The Gervais Principle, by Venkatesh Rao, which looks to be a very interesting book indeed, notwithstanding the following somewhat lukewarm passage in the review:
Most people have a special place in their heart for the book that first made them understand the idea of status economics. Gervais Principle does a good enough job with this that I’m sure it had a profound effect on some people.
To that I can very much relate. For while I’m too slow a reader to make it through more than just very few books, I can still confirm a profound effect, from an essay instead, Kevin Simler’s Social Status: Down the rabbit hole (which comes accompanied by two more texts). But before we go on, I should perhaps echo Simler’s opening warning to readers that this is a “red-pill” topic.
What I definitely did not get before reading Simler’s 2015 essay was that there are, crucially, two kinds of social status, dominance and prestige, very different albeit often hard to untangle. This two-faced nature is something that even Robin Hanson, status maestro and by now Simler’s co-author of a book, may not always emphasise enough. And academic literature, while aware of the distinction, seems to usually refer to a 2001 paper by Joseph Henrich and Francisco Gil-White, whose prestige-status theory, however high my opinion of Henrich’s work in general, is not plausible — as Simler shows, who credits instead Amotz Zahavi, and also and especially Jean-Louis Dessalles. So, spurred into action by the above quotation from ACX, here I present my own contribution to the topic, drawing on Simler. Let’s say for simplicity that we humans descend from baboons (not true), then one can frame it like this:
Dominance status is derived straight from baboon society and is about knowing, maintaining and improving one’s rank in the dominance hierarchy.
Prestige status, by contrast, is new in human society, and is about being a desirable team member.
That’s basically just taken from Simler’s essay, except for the baboons — those instead feature in this 2014 book chapter (claiming effects of social hierarchy on health) titled “Of Baboons and Men”. Furthermore, I will distinguish between “D people”, who care about dominance status, and “P people”, who care about the prestige sort. While many or most real people will care about both, and few about neither, I submit that a considerable number of us are indeed concerned about one kind of social status, either D or P depending on the person, much more than about the other.
With that said, let us embark on a handful of exercises in order to explore the distinction.
Exercise 1. A visit to a nightclub by a D and a P person. Which one of them is apt to shine on the open dancefloor?
The P visitor could certainly do that, if he’s a good dancer, in order to show off physical prowess which could be useful for a team. But to the D visitor, while he might be interested in exhibiting physicality as well, an open dancefloor would appear intuitively risky, I think; better lean against a wall to have that side covered at least. If you don’t know what’s going on behind you, a lower-D-ranked rival could stab you in the back. Although even visibility as such is already not D-ideal, since the rival could take aim at you with a rifle.
We can see that D plays out differently in human society even though the principle (“platonic form”, Simler calls it) is straight from the baboons. For humans have weapons. As Simler writes, following Dessalles (who follows Christopher Boehm), weaponry looks like a plausible reason behind the human shift towards P. The alpha baboon can reign on his own, whereas even the strongest human being is still vulnerable to weapon-assisted attacks, and therefore needs some cooperation.
As another illustration of the difference, superior physique may also not cut it any longer if the opposition possesses lots of money, to buy them weapons, or mercenaries, etc. I should perhaps note, though, that I don’t want to accuse A, the owner of the club and known to have lots of money, of anything like that.
Exercise 2. On A, does her money confer D or P?
A bit strange to ask this, after I just already implied the answer to be D. Yet Simler says P! I even thought he might be mistaken on that one. But then came to understand his reasoning when reading his earlier essay that he refers to, another really and typically strong one, Wealth: The Toxic Byproduct. The best way to understand money as P-conferring in this logic may be to imagine it as earned in a well-functioning market economy and destined to be burnt, a destination that gets rid of its D side, among other things. The point is then that such money could serve as the “ledger of status transactions”, a P-phenomenon and recurring theme on ACX recently, mentioned there in the aforementioned Gervais review as well as notably in this earlier book review.
What is wanted on a team is value-givers, not value-takers. The common way the ledger works would be, say, you having dinner in a restaurant with a friend and paying the bill, which means you P-win and they lose. Or you might provide material to them that helps them in their research. Or send them a funny cat video they can enjoy. Or whatever. There are many ways to provide value. Transactions can be added and subtracted: you’re still P-ahead if you’re the one who paid, say, on three out of five similar dinner occasions. And if there are witnesses1 to a transaction, there are accordingly many more P-points to be won and lost. Now, under the above conditions, money earned in a well-functioning market economy and destined to be burnt; and if the status “audience” has studied Simler’s Wealth essay; or studied Paul Graham’s Wealth essay; or perhaps, if they somehow refuse to venture outside Substack, at least perused my earlier post that began by invoking Graham’s essay; then yes, the money as such should confer P. For as Simler notes (albeit not for nightclubs in particular), a key conclusion in his Wealth essay: “The money you’ve earned represents value you’ve contributed to society.”
Anyway, to return to the two visitors of A’s club, how did they actually get in? I’m not asking since I’m criticising their outfits, or anything of that kind. I would be out of my depth. Rather, it was a time when Covid-19 vaccination was mandatory for entry, but vaccines were still in short supply, not yet available for people their age. The answer is that the visitors had early access to vaccination since, although you wouldn’t normally notice it, they both suffer from particular health issues.
Exercise 3. How open are they about these issues?
Well, D will probably be cagey about it. Or should he let rivals in on a hidden weakness? For P, however, the situation teaches us about an interesting and typical tension. On the one hand, impaired health may cost attractiveness as a team member. On the other, someone prone to queue-jumping is not attractive for a team either. And by admitting the health problem, accusations of jumping the vaccination queue can be avoided.
Frequently the P-tension takes an inverted form of that, revolving around a strength rather than a weakness. On the one hand, P-points get awarded for being capable at something, since we want capable people on the team — but, on the other, deducted for bragging about it, since we also want humble people, who won’t claim an overly big share of the fruits of our joint endeavours. Hence, for best P results, skills should just naturally come on display. Like when our P nightclub visitor shines on the dancefloor. He doesn’t do that to show off. He’s simply there to have fun.
Actually, in reality, that’s not true. As it happens, he hates the dancefloor. So he and D instead retreat to a quiet zone with W, to debate the integrated information theory of consciousness. They are clearly shown by W, who we assume to be not of higher status, that this theory, which they both previously publicly endorsed, is weak.
Exercise 4. Which one will happily concede the argument?
Neither. Certainly, D will be averse to being dominated by W in this way. But for P, there is, if anything, even more at stake! A reputation for erring means being compromised as a team member, and badly. This seems way more critical than health issues, for example. What weight is your voice going to carry in a team meeting if precedent is stuck in others’ minds of you having been wrong in the past?
Thus, like so many characteristics, a willingness to admit mistakes is not something that separates D and P easily. But with an eye for subtleties, sometimes we can work out the difference. Imagine a writer on the internet who has (not that unusual a characteristic) never conceded a major point in an argument. But who on the other hand sometimes begins an essay in the style of “I used to think [...] however, recently I realised [...]”. From a P perspective, the problem is still there, at least partly, in this essay beginning; we don’t want someone on the team to whom it can happen, indeed by their own admission in this case, that they believe the wrong thing. But from a D perspective, the problem is gone, there is no domination here by anyone else!
This essay writer could be a D person, then. And why not continue in the same spirit:
Exercise 5. Imagine some highly obscure internet writer elects to frame the D-versus-P issue like the author of the present post did. Are you likely dealing with a D or a P person?
Of the role of witnesses to status transactions, the ACX Gervais review includes a short discussion. What’s clear is that stakes can go up disproportionately if a third party is looking. While I would think that the two participants do, in principle, qualify as witnesses themselves, I guess they are discounted because of their particular freedom to interpret the results in their own favour. Rao apparently claims that transactions between status-literate people are meaningless without an observer: i.e. the freedom is total. In the D case — and the example in the ACX review, a contest of witty putdowns, is D-heavy — that would seem to mean a marked change from baboon society, since surely a ranking conflict between two baboons is meaningful even if no one is looking? Though I guess it’s possible. And I haven’t read Rao’s book, just the ACX review.